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I appreciate the comity and care with which Jeff Orleans has responded to my paper. 
He brings years of experience, intelligence and insight to this colloquy. I concur 
with much of his analysis on the value of college athletics, the appropriateness of 
a measure of institutional financial support to athletics departments, and the impact 
of the FBS programs on the rest of Division I and Divisions II and III. I also agree 
that it makes good sense to attempt to standardize the accounting of college athletics 
and to make transparent its results.1 Similarly, I have no problem with a renewed 
effort to change the financial culture of college athletics and to support an end to 
“emergency” funding of athletic department deficits.
My primary disagreement with Jeff Orleans is that I believe it makes no sense 
to hold potentially significant reforms hostage to the success of an effort (a) to 
standardize college athletics accounting, (b) to open the accounting books, (c) to 
change a financial culture that has evolved over the course of the past century and 
(d) to develop a coherent long-term plan for reform.
The financial problems confronting college athletics are pressing. Deficits are 
growing and inequalities are sharpening. The rates of increase in athletic spending 
cannot be sustained in an environment where the underlying financial model of higher 
education is so fragile. With the cost of college education soaring to over $50,000 
annually at our nation’s top schools, with university endowments suffering from the 
collapse in the stock market, with projected weakness in our national economy and 
with the new educational models opened up by the internet, U.S. universities can no 
longer be indifferent to the profligate spending patterns in intercollegiate athletics.
As I wrote in my initial paper, Jim Isch, Dan Fulks and NACUBO have been 
involved in a salutary effort to standardize, clarify and make more inclusive account-
ing practices in college athletics departments. They have made some progress, but 
there is a long road still to travel. The variations among schools and the accounting 
conundrums are simply too complex for easy answers. Assuming that a reasonable 
standardized system is developed some time in the future, there is then the ques-
tion of getting schools to open their full books to build transparency, and, last but 
not least, there is the issue of monitoring the system. The latter entails not only 
preparing a legion of auditors, but also the NCAA filling the type of role that the 
IRS now does with our tax system. The NCAA will have to be an enforcer, issuing 
sanctions to schools who file incomplete or inaccurate reports.
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I agree with Jeff Orleans that, if we ever reached a place of open, comprehen-
sive and accurate information about each school, it would help to apply greater 
pressure on ADs to be fiscally responsible. It would still not be reasonable, how-
ever, to expect athletic departments to all of a sudden adhere to a balanced budget 
philosophy. Why not? First, there would be a host of accounting gimmicks that 
could be employed: off-budget expenditures; using the basketball arena for a few 
rock concerts during the year and pushing half of the arena’s operating costs and 
debt service onto the music department or another budget; inadequate accounting 
for indirect capital and personnel costs; shifting concessions, catering or parking 
revenue from another department to athletics; identifying a lower charge than the 
face value of room and board for scholarship athletes; and so on.
Second, there is a basic structural problem that lies at the root of the common 
deficit experience in athletic departments. Namely, there are no stockholders 
demanding quarterly profits to boost the value of the company’s stock. Instead, 
there are stakeholders (boosters, students, alums, trustees) who demand victory of 
a not-for-profit entity. That is, the underlying organizational logic veers resources 
toward finding victories, not profits. When an additional revenue stream is projected 
for athletics, ADs easily find a way to spend it in the pursuit of victory. It is this 
structural circumstance and organizational logic that engenders the lax financial 
culture that leads to the deficits. This culture has been impervious to previous 
attempts at budgetary discipline, as it will be to any new attempt that does not 
attack the underlying structure and logic of intercollegiate athletics.
Jeff Orleans talks about the imposition of “consequences if there are consis-
tent deficits.” This gets to the essence of the issue. In a free market environment, 
the consequence of consistent deficits is bankruptcy. What is the consequence in 
a nonprofit, stilted market environment? Will the program be closed? Will the AD 
on a long-term contract be fired, even if he or she has a winning record? The con-
sequences of budgetary indiscipline in a market environment are clear and harsh; 
not so with intercollegiate athletics.
We all recognize that intercollegiate athletics is a hybrid of professional and 
amateur elements. Few of us advocate that the amateur element be jettisoned. The 
conjoining of the two opposite elements, however, implies that the system will 
always have contradictions and tensions. In my view, the solution to the structural 
problem is not to completely commercialize the system, subjecting all its parts 
to the full force of market discipline. Yet, absent market discipline, there must be 
strong measures, not mere exhortation.
Jeff Orleans appears more sanguine about change from within the NCAA, in 
part, because of the 1996 restructuring reform. With it, he and others believe that 
college presidents today have voting control over the NCAA and, therefore, are now 
in a position to assert budgetary discipline. Perhaps, but the fact of the matter is that 
presidents have always had the statutory ability to control the NCAA if they wanted 
to do so. For reasons I outlined in my keynote paper, they have not wanted to do so.
But suppose, against all odds, the hortatory approach works and intercollegiate 
athletics finds financial discipline. What kind of changes should we expect? There 
is no basis in Jeff Orleans’ package to lead one to anticipate that astronomical 
coaches’ salaries or other areas of excess will be addressed; in the current skewed 
market of college sports, the prevailing view is that all of these excesses help teams 
to win. Rather, we are likely to witness a reduction in the sponsorship of sports 
programs, and, hence, lower student-athlete participation numbers; thereby sub-
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verting the underlying true purpose of college sports. Such has been the strategy 
of the University of Texas in reducing its intercollegiate competition to an FBS 
minimum of 16 sports and, then, concentrating the saved resources on football 
and basketball.
Jeff Orleans closes with a number of observations about being cautious before 
getting the government involved. His first observation is that: “The athletic com-
munity will have more control over the changes that it initiates than over ‘reform’ 
that originates in Congress or otherwise is imposed externally.” This is probably 
true, but isn’t it also an argument for the NCAA to be proactive around the structur-
ing of legislation that would underwrite an antitrust exemption, rather than waiting 
for Congress to take action?
There is a related question about whether we can ever expect true reform from 
an association that has been and continues to be managed by athletics directors, 
conference commissioners and coaches. And if we can’t, then it is a nonstarter to 
call for effective reform to be initiated by the NCAA. (This should not be read as 
a criticism of the men and women who run the NCAA. I have the utmost respect 
for them. It is rather a comment about the structural realities that constrain them.)
Next, Jeff Orleans invokes a series of probability statements about “going to 
Washington” that seem to come out of thin air. The first is: “It’s likely that there 
will be only one chance to get Congressional action.” The history of legislative 
action provides no support whatsoever for this assertion.
He continues: “some observers might consider the most direct precedents for 
an antitrust exemption—in the major professional leagues—include overall salary 
caps and revenue sharing, both of which will be problematic in Division I.” This is 
inaccurate. Baseball obtained its presumed blanket antitrust exemption in 1922, well 
before there was any talk of salary caps and revenue sharing. Similarly, the NFL, 
NBA and NHL got their partial exemption for the purpose of cartelizing national 
sponsored television rights in 1961, well before any of those leagues had a salary 
cap. The NFL’s Congressional permission to merge with the AFL, and the NBA’s 
to join with the ABA, each came well before either league introduced a salary cap 
or their modern systems of revenue sharing.
Jeff Orleans then asserts: “It seems certain that Congress will expect not simply 
periodic review of the effects of any exemption, but some means to assure those 
effects actually will be positive.” He attempts to demonstrate this “certainty” by 
reference to Congressman Tom McMillen’s antitrust exemption bill in the 1990s 
directed at college television. The bill provided an option for Congress to consider 
direct regulation if the NCAA did not take advantage of its exemption. Thus, 
Orleans’ claim to certainty appears to be based on a sample of one. The fact of the 
matter is that Congress often passes bills without such provisions. For instance, in 
1998 it passed the Curt Flood Act in baseball which lifted baseball’s exemption in 
the realm of labor relations. There was no provision for oversight and intervention. 
Nonetheless, if the Congress were to grant the NCAA an antitrust exemption for 
the purpose of controlling coaches’ salaries and the NCAA did nothing, then why 
shouldn’t Congress take matters into its own hands and impose some controls?
Let us remember that government is already very involved in college sports 
through Title IX, Pell Grants, tax exemptions and privileges, periodic hearings, 
investigations and reports, facility and infrastructure investment (state government), 
inter alia. Congress certainly doesn’t need the pretext of an antitrust exemption to 
notice the existence of or seek to influence college sports.
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Orleans writes that an exemption might create “the expectation that the IRS 
would have the right to determine if the resulting framework would be consistent 
with its ‘excess compensation’ standards for highly-paid employees in tax-exempt 
entities.” But through the private inurement or private benefit doctrines, the IRS 
already has the right to do this, if they so choose.2
What is true, as Jeff Orleans suggests, is that if the NCAA goes to Congress 
for an antitrust exemption, it would make perfect sense for the NCAA to clearly 
define what the scope of the exemption should be. That is, should the NCAA be 
able to impose cost controls, not only on coaches’ salaries, but also on recruitment 
expenditures, stadium spending, AD compensation, tutoring centers for athletes, 
travel policies—all areas that are intended to attract the best athletes to their school 
which they cannot do through the normal market mechanism of offering higher 
salaries to prospective student-athletes? Or should the exemption be limited to a 
subset of these items? An argument for restricting the exemption to the compen-
sation of coaches and ADs is that such a limitation would have no impact on the 
quality of the football and basketball being played (because the excess payment is 
all economic rent) and because it would begin to preserve some ethical consistency 
if coaches and ADs were not paid more than the highest paid professors or than the 
university president at an institution whose priority is supposed to be education, 
not sports. There are many complicated issues involved in delineating the scope of 
any exemption, and it is a subject that would need to be discussed at some length 
by NCAA committees, lawyers and politicians in Washington.
As I stated in my original paper, I have no illusions that any of my proposed 
reforms will come to pass in the near future. The restriction of football scholarships 
is the reform in nearest grasp. A football playoff and an antitrust exemption require 
much more work. True reform is never easy. Interim NCAA President Jim Isch 
commented to USA Today that my talk at the colloquium was “a stretch.” (Wieberg, 
2010) I think Jim was right. It was intended to be a stretch. Any reform worth 
having is a reform worth fighting for. If there’s no stretch, there’s no real reform.
Notes
1. Although I note that Mr. Orleans appears to conflate a balance sheet with an income state-
ment.
2. Colombo confuses the matter when he asserts that if a college coach is paid as much as a 
professional coach, then he must be receiving compensation of fair market value. As I argued in 
my keynote paper, if the college team has a revenue one-fifth that of the pro team and the coaches 
of the two teams receive near equal salaries, this outcome is not consistent with a finding of fair 
market value. In any event, under the private benefit doctrine, compensation can be deemed 
excessive even if it is at fair market value.
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